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Abstract: This paper investigates fiscal policy sustainability in Peru, the 
Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Venezuela using competing 
methodologies. Standard unit roots and cointegration analyses do not endorse the 
validity of the intertemporal budget constraint. In contrast, to varying degree 
across-countries, alternative testing employing a fiscal policy reaction function 
indicates sustainability defined as surplus adjustments in response to higher debt 
to income ratios. Corresponding debt-dynamics analyses show that corrective 
measures were put in place to revert non-sustainable trends in government debt. 
However, ancillary variables in the debt modeling produce statistically weak 
evidence of procyclical fiscal behavior in the Latin American countries. 
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Tiivistelmä: Tutkimuksessa arvioidaan veropolitiikan kestävyyttä Perussa, Filip-
piineillä, Etelä-Afrikassa, Thaimaassa ja Venezuelassa. Yksikköjuurten tai yh-
teisintegroituvuuden testeillä ei saatu tukea budjettirajoitteen pitävyydelle yli 
ajan. Lisäksi kestävyyttä testattiin veropolitiikan reaktiofunktiolla, jossa kestä-
vyys määritellään ylijäämäsopeutumiseksi velka-tulosuhteen muuttuessa. Tes-
teissä havaittiin, että veropolitiikka olisi kestävällä pohjalla. Vastaava velka-
sopeutuksen analyysi osoittaa, että maat reagoivat tarvittavalla tavalla velan kas-
vuun. Kuitenkin analyysiä täydentävät muuttujat osoittivat tilastollisesti heikkoa 
myötäsyklisyyttä latinalaisen amerikan veropolitiikassa. 
Asiasanat: veropolitiikan kestävyys, veropolitiikan reaktiofunktiot, kehi-
tysmaatSummary
Measuring fiscal policy sustainability is fundamental, and for developed 
countries there is ample evidence on the topic. However, the literature on 
developing countries is more limited, and that is particularly so regarding 
investigations that contrast country experiences and implement alternative 
methodological approaches. And yet developing economies are prone to fiscal 
imbalances.
This paper contributes to the understanding of fiscal policy sustainability in 
developing countries. The investigation focuses on economies from Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America: Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Venezuela. 
The research plan consists in recounting economic and fiscal policy 
developments in each of these countries, and in employing alternative empirical 
methods in testing fiscal sustainability. 
The study finds that the benchmark condition for the government’s budget 
surplus is not binding in Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and 
Venezuela. However, the investigation also applies Bohn’s (1998) fiscal policy 
reaction function approach. Using this framework the behavior of budget 
surpluses indicates fiscal sustainability – albeit statistically weakly.
Additionally, debt-dynamics analyses show that corrective measures were put in 
place to revert non-sustainable trends in debt to GDP ratios. Notably, the 
evidence backing fiscal sustainability in Thailand is particularly robust. In 
contrast, the results for the Philippines and South Africa are mixed, and rather 
weak for Peru and Venezuela. Moreover, the ancillary variables in the debt 
modeling produce statistically weak evidence of procyclical fiscal behavior in the 
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References 141. Introduction 
Measuring fiscal policy sustainability is fundamental, and for developed 
countries there is ample evidence on the topic (Hamilton and Flavin, 1986; 
Trehan and Walsh, 1988; Ahmed and Rogers, 1995; Bohn, 1998; Afonso, 2005). 
But the literature on developing countries is more limited, and that is particularly 
so regarding investigations that contrast country experiences and implement 
alternative methodological approaches. Yet developing economies are prone to 
fiscal imbalances. 
In recent history this vulnerability has been exacerbated by various adverse
developments. These include the 1970s oil price shocks, and the international 
debt crisis, credit crunch, and worsening in commodity prices in the early 1980s. 
Consequently, many developing countries found themselves in unsustainable 
fiscal positions and requested assistance from the international financial 
institutions. And this implied that they had to pursue fiscal budget restraining 
policies and structural adjustment. More generally, a plethora of idiosyncratic 
obstacles, like highly concentrated tax systems and expenditure rigidities, 
complicate developing countries’ efforts to consolidate their fiscal positions 
(Burgess and Stern, 1993).  
This paper contributes to the understanding of fiscal policy sustainability in 
developing countries. The investigation focuses on economies from Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America. Namely Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and 
Venezuela. The research plan consists in recounting economic and fiscal policy 
developments in each of these countries, and in employing alternative empirical 
methods in testing fiscal sustainability.
This approach facilitates answering the following country-specific policy 
questions. What are the main challenges developing economies face in achieving 
fiscal sustainability? If so, under what circumstances did reforming institutions 
and policies progress? Can empirical modeling generate evidence of corrective 
fiscal actions in response to an increasing debt to GDP ratio?
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 relates economic and fiscal policy 
developments in Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Venezuela. 
Section 3 explains the standard fiscal sustainability condition for the 
government’s fiscal surplus and Bohn’s fiscal policy reaction function approach. 
In so doing it emphasises qualifications to have in mind when applying these 
methodologies to developing countries. Section 4 carries out the empirical 
modelling. Section 5 provides concluding remarks.2
2. Macroeconomic and fiscal policy background 
2.1 Peru 
Peru’s recent economic history is marked by political and economic instability.  
During the 1970s expansionary fiscal policy led to serious imbalances. The fiscal 
position was, however, brought under control by the end of the decade partially 
aided by favorable export commodities prices. But despite this improving 
scenario the economy further deteriorated in the early 1980s. Particularly, 
macroeconomic imbalances, the debt crisis, adverse international economic 
conditions, and the damaging impact inflicted by natural phenomena (like El 
Niño) resulted in declining output at the beginning of the decade.   
President Alan Garcia’s administration main task during 1985 and 1986 was 
designing and implementing a heterodox stabilization plan (Lago, 1991). It 
focused on, inter alia, boosting aggregate demand through increases in real wages 
and subsidies and via decreases in taxes. Also, the exchange rate was devalued, 
but kept at the official rate soon after. In fact, later on differentiated exchange 
rates for imports and for exports were put in place. This multiple exchange-rate 
system would later cost the administration dearly, not least in terms of the 
resulting central bank losses. 
These policies had an initial net expansionary impact, mainly reflected in higher 
GDP growth. But the exchange rate policy led to currency overvaluation, 
alongside a deteriorating fiscal stance. The outcome was recession at the end of 
the 1980s. And so in 1988 the government embarked on a further stabilization 
attempt. This fresh plan devalued the currency, and focused on addressing the 
new policies’ social impact. Nonetheless, 1988 saw contracting output, a 
depreciating exchange rate, and a ballooning rate of inflation. Tight monetary 
and fiscal polices ensued, alongside the pressure from social unrest.  Regardless 
of these efforts there was hyperinflation from 1988 – largely arising from the 
monetization of the large fiscal imbalances.
Subsequently, in tandem with similar developments across Latin America, the 
1990s brought a series of wide-ranging structural reforms, and a new 
stabilization strategy. Trade liberalization, fiscal reform, privatization, and public 
sector restructuring were at the heart of the reforms programme. In spite of these 
reforming efforts, further contraction followed the 1990s stabilization 
programme. But from 1993 onwards output picked-up and Peru’s economy went 
on to display sustained economic growth in the next five years. This was largely 
a by-product of the structural reforms implemented earlier in the decade and of 
the tighter fiscal policy stance. These developments, alongside the 
implementation of an inflation targeting framework from 1997, consolidate 
Peru’s tools for safeguarding macroeconomic stability. 3
2.2 The Philippines 
The Philippines economy has somewhat lagged behind after implementing a 
relatively successful industrialization strategy in the 1960s. The 1970s and 1980s 
were marred by inflation and overall macroeconomic instability. Moreover, 
during the 1980s the Philippines faced a contracting economy from 1983 to 1985, 
eventually recovering during 1988. But this upturn was short-lived, and the 
economy contracted again in 1992. Fiscal policy is one factor at the heart of this 
boom-bust cycles. Actually, several authors document the low tax collection to 
GDP ratios in the Philippines. In contrast, other Asian economies, such as 
Malaysia and Thailand, have somewhat succeeded in achieving a more solid 
fiscal stance.
A major turning point for the Philippines’ economy was the IMF-supported 
stabilization programme agreed in 1994. Parallel to this, giving independence to 
monetary policy was a remarkable advance. In fact, in 1993 a new Central Bank 
was established and replaced the old Central Bank of the Philippines. Notably, 
the latter became insolvent as a result of the 1980s private banking sector rescue 
effort. The 1997 Asian crisis was an early test for the newly created Central 
Bank, and in fact the Philippines stirred-through that problem somewhat 
successfully.
These developments should contribute to achieving a sound fiscal policy stance 
in the Philippines, tackling non-sustainable fiscal trends from its roots. To this 
end fiscal policy was also directly reformed by introducing a wide-ranging tax 
reform package. This package featured expanded value added tax and trade 
liberalization. Privatization of government-owned enterprises was a further 
element in the reforming endeavor.
But Lim and Montes (2002) document that even after introducing substantial 
policy reforms in the last twenty years the Philippines produce a weak economic 
performance. They attribute that to macroeconomic instability and to low saving 
rates. This highlights the fact that fiscal soundness is an important pre-condition 
for achieving overall macroeconomic stability and economic growth.  
2.3 South Africa 
South Africa displayed an increasing government debt during most of the 1970s. 
Yet this trend was successfully reverted from the end of that decade largely due 
to increasing government revenues from Gold mining. However, from the 
beginning of the 1980s the South African government went on to have an 
increasingly larger participation in economic activity. This was mainly reflected 
in expanding government expenditure and a correspondingly higher tax burden, 
which ultimately translated into an upward trending debt-GDP ratio. 
In fact, until the mid-1990s South Africa’s government debt was growing 
considerably. And this was the case even in the light of privatization, which was 
somehow disappointing in terms of revenue generation. But it is worth pointing 
out that several, somewhat exogenous, factors were at least partly responsible for 4
the observed fiscal outcomes. Amongst these were political and social change, 
economic contraction, and the government’s limited leeway to implement 
restraining fiscal measures.
However, from 1994 South Africa embarked on a reforming agenda to secure its 
fiscal position (IMF, 2003). As a result the deficit has been reduced from roughly 
9% of GDP in 1993 to less than 2% of GDP at the beginning of the 2000s. 
Achieving this fiscal outcome was made possible by improving tax collection 
(for instance, the South African revenue authority was granted administrative 
independence in 1997), and by reducing expenditure. Moreover, at the end of the 
1990s South Africa formally adopted an inflation targeting monetary policy 
strategy. Crucially, adopting this approach demands fiscal soundness, which in 
turn endorses the government’s overall commitment to macroeconomic stability.  
2.4 Thailand 
Thailand is a success story in Asia and across the developing world. Its economy 
has been performing strongly since the 1950s, mainly driven by a successful 
private-sector-focused industrial development strategy. However, the economy 
did suffer as a consequence of the second 1970s oil shock. In fact, Thailand 
ended up resorting to IMF assistance, and that was important in overcoming 
adverse developments in the prices of its key primary export commodities. The 
IMF package was duly linked to a reforming programme. In complying with the 
programme’s conditionality, and within a wider-ranging development effort, 
from the mid-1980s Thailand privatized, embarked on trade liberalization, and 
reformed its fiscal and monetary policy institutions.
As a result the fiscal deficit that arose at the beginning of the decade was wiped-
out, successfully curtailing a non-sustainable fiscal trend. And the deficit actually 
became a surplus by the end of the 1980s. These developments translated into 
higher economic growth and macroeconomic stability during most of the 1980s. 
Yet by the end of that decade Thailand’s economy was facing new challenges. 
Particularly difficult was handling the large amount of inflowing capital during 
that period. This development led to latent inflationary pressures becoming a real 
threat to macroeconomic stability. Although they were somehow contained until 
the early 1990s, capital flows were at least partly responsible for the economy’s 
collapse later during the decade. 
Thailand recovered rather quickly from the floating of the Thai baht and from the 
resulting regional and global turmoil known as the Asian crisis. An IMF report 
(IMF, 2002) remarks that even after the country’s economic crisis in 1997 its 
fiscal stance did not compare unfavorably to that of other emerging market 
economies. And, key to the analysis to be developed in this paper, the same study 
highlights Thailand’s success in consolidating its debt and in generating fiscal 
surpluses during the decade before 1997. Achieving a positive fiscal stance was 
instrumental in weathering the uproar from the Asian crisis.5
2.5 Venezuela 
Venezuela’s economic performance in the last two decades has been weak. This 
period has seen macroeconomic instability and deteriorating living standards in 
spite of, and arguably to some extent due to, the economy’s oil abundance 
(Rodríguez and Sachs, 1999).
1 Lax fiscal policy management has likely 
exacerbated this weak performance. For instance, even though Venezuela did 
benefit from the oil price hikes of the 1970s the proceeds were mainly committed 
to financing fiscal shortcomings. In fact, Venezuela’s economy has registered 
fiscal deficits almost continuously during the last three decades. And, as in the 
rest of Latin America, the 1980s brought adverse financial conditions that 
exacerbated the economy’s underlying fragile position. 
During the 1990s Venezuela suffered from unfavorable developments. These 
included declining oil prices, political unrest during 1992-1993, and a 
consequential banking crisis in 1994-1995. Still, fiscal policy consolidated in 
1996, helped by a strongly performing oil sector. Additionally, in 1996 the 
country signed a stand-by agreement with the IMF, and contributed to improving 
economic conditions. But Venezuela’s low non-oil fiscal proceeds linger as a 
major concern. That is why a major challenge for the economy is diversifying its 
revenue sources away from oil. However, resuming sustainable economic growth 
is essential before the non-oil economy can be successfully taxed.    
1 Hausmann and Rigobón (2003) advance alternative insights on resource rich economies.  6
3. Alternative tests of fiscal sustainability 
3.1 Benchmark intertemporal sustainability test 
The benchmark method for measuring fiscal sustainability involves an 
intertemporal analysis (Hamilton and Flavin, 1986). Essentially, for fiscal policy 
to be sustainable every deficit should be financed by a future surplus. So the 
standard equation for testing the government’s budget surplus intertemporal 
sustainability can be written as
. H G O     G R       (1)
The hypotheses to be tested in (1) are thatH is stationary, and that 1   G . The 
economic implications of these hypotheses are that the government’s expenditure 
(G) and revenue (R) move together in the long-run. Thus a sustainable fiscal 
policy is compatible with finding cointegration in Engle and Granger’s (1987) 
sense.  More precisely, if 1   G all public expenditure will be financed by revenue 
and public debt will not be growing without bound (no-Ponzi-game condition). 
In contrast, if these variables are not cointegrated the gap between them will be 
growing indefinitely, and fiscal policy is not sustainable.  
What stipulations should be made when applying this framework to developing 
countries? Probably the most important is that several revenue sources usually 
coexist. These include central bank financing, foreign debt issuance and other 
domestic sources such as commercial banks and trade credit. Thus capturing all 
potential revenue sources via equation (1) is unfeasible.  
A further problem characterizing developing countries is the timing of tax 
collection. This feature is also known as the Olivera-Tanzi effect. It basically 
postulates that inflationary developments can erode the real value of fiscal 
revenues by the time of collection. But there are other factors to be considered, 
such as the Patinkin or reversed Olivera-Tanzi effect.
This sort of qualification should be pondered as one amongst a series of more 
structural features characterizing taxation in development as discussed by, inter 
alia, Burgess and Stern (1993). A third major concern when investigating 
equation (1) is that for most developing countries data is limited. And testing for 
cointegration ideally demands long-run time series data.
3.2 Bohn’s tests of fiscal sustainability 
Bohn’s (1998) procedure allows determining if a government is taking corrective 
actions to comply with its intertemporal budget constraint by analyzing the 
relationship between the budget surplus   Y
S  and the debt to GDP   Y
D  ratios. 
Bohn postulates that if   Y
S  reacts positively to   Y
D  this could be interpreted as 
a signal showing that the government is undertaking the necessary actions to 
achieve fiscal policy sustainability. 7
The relevant equation for analyzing the relationship between the surplus to GDP 
and the debt to GDP ratios can be written as 
    . 3 2 1 1 0 t t t t t YVAR GVAR Y
D
Y
S H E E E E      
 (2)
In equation (2) the variables GVAR and YVAR should help in accounting for 
temporary government spending and business cycle factors, respectively. They 
derive from Barro’s (1979) fiscal policy model.
2 Furthermore, controlling for 
these factors also helps in accounting for the potential impact of omitted vari-
ables. So it follows that in equation (2) 1 E should be positive if fiscal policy is 
complying with an intertemporal budget constraint, while 2 E and 3 E are expected 
to carry negative signs. That is, the surplus would decrease if the government is 
spending more than usual, or if the economy is contracting. 
In addition to equation (2), Bohn (1998) suggests testing fiscal sustainability by 
investigating debt-dynamics. To this end he develops an augmented Dickey-
Fuller-type regression such as 
    . 3 2 1 1 0 t t t t t YVAR GVAR Y
D
Y
D ] D D D D       '
 (3)
Equation (3) measures if changes in the debt to GDP ratio ('is the difference 
operator) displays mean reversion, and this would imply that the government is 
complying with an intertemporal budget constraint. Consequently, in equation (3) 
1 D is expected to be negative, whereas 2 D and 3 D should be positive.
Why could Bohn’s approach be suitable in analyzing developing countries? 
Bohn’s tests are somehow more flexible than the standard intertemporal analysis, 
as they only ask if a government is exercising the necessary actions to comply 
with the intertemporal budget constraint. Further, this approach does not demand 
any assumptions about interest rates, which also seems practical in modeling 
developing countries. In this regard Bohn argues that a positive response of the 
primary surplus to developments in the debt to income ratio conveys reliable 
information about fiscal sustainability in spite of how interest rates and growth 
rates compare. 
Additionally, Bohn’s tests have as an imperative controlling for cyclical 
economic fluctuations. He justifies this peculiarity by discussing the pitfalls from 
2 The variablesGVARandYVAR are constructed as in Barro (1986). The formulae are 
GVAR:
*
tt
t
gg
y
 , andYVAR : , 1
*
* ¸
¹
·
¨
©
§ x ¸
¹
·
¨
©
§ 
t
t
t
t
y
g
y
y  where  g and
* g are actual and long-
term real government spending, while y and
* y  are real potential and actual output, respective-
ly.8
analyzing a univariate time series of the debt to income ratio, which is 
particularly susceptible to economic shocks and fluctuations. Unquestionably, 
this qualification is vital for developing countries. That is the case because such 
economies tend to experience higher macroeconomic volatility than more 
advanced economies (Agènor, McDermott, and Prasad, 2000). Furthermore, the 
variables GVAR and YVAR help in improving the accuracy of the econometrics 
analyses.9
4. Empirical modeling 
4.1 Data 
The econometric modeling that follow employ data on government revenue, 
expenditure, debt, output, prices, and population in calculating G, R, Y
S , Y
D ,
GVAR, and YVAR for each country in the sample. The data are annual for the 
period 1970-2000, and the sources are the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators and the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial 
Statistics. Table A1 provides further details on the data.  
4.2 Unit Roots and Cointegration Testing 
In the following analyses G and R are expressed in (logs) real per capita terms. 
According to the Dickey-Fuller and Dickey-Fuller tests (Dickey and Fuller, 
1979) in Table 1, G and R contain unit roots in their levels but become stationary 
after first-differencing. That is, they are integrated of order one [I (1)]. Further 
ahead the paper will be analyzing the time series properties of the remaining 
variables.
Table 1 also shows the results from analyzing equation (1) using Engle and 
Granger’s (EG) (1987) cointegration test, as well as the long-run solutions to the 
corresponding autoregressive distributed lags (ADL) equations (Banerjee, 
Dolado, and Galbraith, 1993). For the ADL estimations the lag length was set to 
one. The residuals from the EG and the ADL regressions imply that the 
hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot be rejected for Peru, the Philippines, South 
Africa, Thailand, and Venezuela. That is, cointegrating relationships cannot be 
unveiled from these countries’ regressions.
However, the evidence in section 2 suggests an effort to deliver sound fiscal 
management in most countries, and particularly in Thailand. So in checking the 
robustness of the EG and of the ADL regressions the paper moves on to applying 
Phillips and Hansen’s (1990) fully modified OLS estimator (FM-OLS). Phillips 
and Hansen’s econometric simulations show that in small samples the FM-OLS 
technique could have advantages over the traditional EG and ADL regressions. 
The outcomes from estimating equation (1) using this technique (not reported) 
corroborate the EG and ADL results showing that the no-Ponzi-Game condition 
is not binding in Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Venezuela.
3
4.3 Estimating Bohn’s fiscal reaction functions 
The paper moves on to applying Bohn’s (1998) approach. This exercise measures 
  Y
S  as nominal government revenues minus expenditures (primary surplus) 
                                                
3 Additional testing (not reported) cannot reject a unit root in the surplus to GDP ratios across 
our sample. 10
divided by nominal output, and   Y
D  is the debt to GDP ratio for each country.
4
Table 2 exhibits the results from estimating equation (2) using OLS, and reports 
t-ratios computed using heteroscedasticty and autocorrelation consistent standard 
errors.
5 This analysis confirms the previous section’s findings. That is, using this 
criterion fiscal policy does not appear to be sustainable (on average during 1972-
2000) in Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Venezuela.  
These countries’ budget surpluses are not responding positively to increasing 
debt to GDP ratios, as hypothesized by Bohn (1998). In fact, for all the countries 
1 E is negative; and for Peru, Thailand and Venezuela these coefficients double 
their standard errors. However, for the Philippines and for South Africa the 
coefficients are not statistically significant. Importantly, for all the countries the 
coefficients on GVAR and YVAR are negative – as predicted by Barro’s tax-
smoothing model- but not always statistically significant.
However, a caveat applies to the above modeling. And it is that from a policy 
perspective coefficients reflecting average behavior over a 30-year time span are 
only of limited value. They likely conceal important within sample 
developments. Gaining further insight may be possible by, for instance, 
estimating the recursive t-ratios corresponding to the crucial 1 E coefficients.
Figure 1 displays graphs containing such estimations. Thailand clearly stands 
out: even though its surplus did not systematically respond, on average, as 
predicted by Bohn it has done so after the mid-1980s. In fact, 1 E ’s recursive t-
ratio increases consistently from the mid-1980s, rising above 2.5 by the end of 
the sample in 2000.
In contrast, South Africa did show significant and positive surplus reactions to 
increases in the debt to GDP ratio during the 1980s. But this pattern subsequently 
dies out, and 1 E actually turns out to be insignificant by the beginning of the 
1990s. However, there are well-known reasons for this drift towards a non-
sustainable fiscal path (see Section 2). The Philippines’ 1 E  shows a rather similar 
pattern to, but much less marked than, South Africa’s.
Peru and Venezuela end the sample with negative 1 E t-ratios above two, albeit 
Venezuela’s becomes negative before. Particularly, Peru’s 1 E t-ratio is positive 
and marginally significant during the early and mid-1980s. And this behavior 
likely reflects efforts undertaken during this time to curtail the non-sustainable 
fiscal trend generated by the debt crisis.
                                                
4 South Africa’s and Thailand’s debt comprise the government’s total domestic and foreign 
debt. Only the government’s foreign debt is considered for the rest of the countries in the absen-
ce of time series on total debt. 
5 The variables 
* g  and 
* y  are calculated by applying the Hodrick-Prescott filter to the original 
series assigningO a value of 6.5 -as suggested by Ravn and Uhlig (2002) for annual data. 11
Debt-dynamics modeling follows, complementing the fiscal sustainability 
analysis so far. It is worth pointing-out that Barro’s tax-smoothing model argues 
that it may not sensible for a government to systematically run surpluses to pay-
off debt. Undertaking such a policy implies temporarily higher taxes, and that 
goes against the tax-smoothing principle. However, if increasing debt to income 
ratios lead to, for instance, an increasing probability of default, there would be a 
disincentive for building-up abnormally high debt to income ratios.  
Also, developing countries’ common trigger-point for reversing unsustainable 
fiscal trends is the loss of market access caused by crises. Illustrating this fact, 
Latin American countries managed to somehow break-away from the 1980s debt 
predicament by restructuring part of its sizeable debt into trade able bonds (e.g. 
Brady bonds). And in many cases overcoming high debt-ratios involved pursuing 
fiscal restrain via the conditionality attached to IMF-supported stabilization 
programmes.  
Examining the time series properties of the debt to GDP ratios starts the debt 
modeling exercise. The unit root tests in Table 3 reveal non-stationary debt to 
GDP ratios in all the countries excepting Thailand. These results are similar to 
Bohn’s (1998) account on the U. S., and he stresses the fact that the non-rejection 
of a unit root in the debt to GDP ratio features prominently in the literature.
Consequently, estimating Bohn’s equation (3) using the paper’s sample should 
help in further illuminating these results. Interestingly, Table 3 shows that for all 
the economies in our sample fiscal policy seems to be sustainable in Bohn’s 
sense. That is, there is mean reversion in the debt to GDP ratio, as evidenced by 
the negative coefficient on 
1  t Y
D . However, not all the coefficients on 
 
1  t Y
D double their heteroscedasticty and autocorrelation consistent standard 
errors – yet for all but one country all are at least one and a half times as large.
But it seems adequate to employ critical values for ADF statistics in 
determining 1 D ’s significance. The corresponding 1% and 5% critical values are -
2.86 and -3.43. Using these more exacting criteria  1 D is not statistically 
significant at the 5% level for any of the countries. So there is only weak 
statistical support for fiscal sustainability as captured by 1 D .
The ancillary variables GVAR and YVAR carry weakly significant coefficients 
for all the countries in the sample, but nevertheless merit a brief interpretation. 
For the Philippines, South Africa and Thailand the coefficients on GVAR and 
YVAR are positive. This evidence supports Bohn’s predictions and Barro’s tax-
smoothing model. However, the coefficient on YVAR is statistically well-
determined only for the Philippines and for Thailand. And this corresponds with 
the fact that these countries have successfully smoothed-out serious 
macroeconomic fluctuations, notably those arising from the Asian crisis. These 
economies, particularly Thailand, also engineered successful fiscal policy and 
more general macroeconomic strategies in fighting adverse developments during 
the 1980s.12
The debt equations for the Latin American countries contrast with the rest of the 
sample. Specifically, Peru and Venezuela display negative coefficients on GVAR 
and YVAR, pointing to procyclicality in these countries’ debt-dynamics. These 
results, albeit statistically weak, are in harmony with the surplus equations 
reported above. Moreover, that is also the case vis-à-vis the findings in Gavin 
and Perotti (1997) – a paper that investigates a sample of Latin American 
countries including Peru and Venezuela. Gavin and Perotti estimate that the 
fiscal surplus response to an increase in output growth is not significant, and that 
procyclicality appears to be a feature of Latin American fiscal policy.
6
As with the surplus equations, the study computes the recursive t-ratios for the 
1 D  coefficients to gain further insight on within sample developments. Figure 2 
displays these statistics. Peru and Venezuela show a weakening in 1 D during the 
mid-1980s, but to some extent recover by the end of the decade. In Peru’s case 
this pattern coincides with President García’s heterodox stabilization plan. Yet 
both economies show a fairly stable feedback from debt to income ratios on debt-
dynamics during the 1990s. These results may be interpreted as a sign that Peru 
and Venezuela to some extent succeeded in consolidating their fiscal stance. 
The 1 D  coefficients’ t-ratios for the Philippines and for Thailand also show an 
improving fiscal policy stance from the end of the 1980s and into the 1990s. 
Thailand’s debt equation bears the largest shock around the 1997 Asian crisis. 
Finally, South Africa 1 D coefficient’s t-ratio reflects a sound fiscal performance 
during the 1980s, but a failing one from the beginning of the 1990s. Yet as noted 
before, the latter was a time of political, economic, and social transformations. 
Still, South Africa managed to break this non-sustainable fiscal trend later-on 
during the 1990s. 
                                                
6 Explaining fiscal prociclycality in developing countries is quite relevant, and this has led to a 
growing literature approaching the problem from alternative angles. E.g. Aguiar, Amador, and 
Gopinath, 2005; Alesina and Tabellini, 2005; Talvi and Végh, 2005. 13
5. Conclusion 
The paper has investigated fiscal sustainability in a sample of developing 
countries using competing methodologies. It finds that the benchmark condition 
for the government’s budget surplus is not binding in Peru, the Philippines, South 
Africa, Thailand, and Venezuela. The investigation also applies Bohn’s (1998) 
alternative fiscal reaction function approach. Using this framework the behavior 
of budget surpluses indicates fiscal sustainability – albeit statistically weakly.
Additionally, debt-dynamics analyses show that corrective measures were put in 
place to revert non-sustainable trends in debt to GDP ratios. Notably, the 
evidence backing fiscal sustainability in Thailand is particularly robust. In 
contrast, the results for the Philippines and South Africa are mixed, and rather 
weak for Peru and Venezuela. 14
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Table 1.  Unit Roots and Cointegration Tests 
Variables Peru  The
Philippines 
South
Africa Thailand Venezuela 
Part A 
Unit root tests, 1970-2000 
R -2.16 -1.81 -2.77 -1.65  -1.50 
G -2.07 -2.01 -1.32 -2.26  -1.64 
R ' -4.33**(DF) -4.04**  -4.91**  -3.16*  -4.73** 
G ' -5.71**(DF) -3.58*  -4.26**  -3.33*  -3.71** 
          
Part B
Engle-Granger (1970-2000) and ADL (1,1) (1971-2000) OLS regressions, LHS variable isR
RHS/tests  EG  ADL   EG  ADL   EG  ADL   EG  ADL   EG  ADL  
Constant -0.06
(0.19)
0.29
(0.55)
1.40**
(0.23)
1.34*
(0.54)
1.55**
(0.17)
1.52**
(0.34)
-1.07**
(0.31)
-0.75
(1.25)
-2.33
(1.54)
0.78
(3.07)
G 1.02**
(0.07)
0.87**
(0.22)
0.63**
(0.06)
0.65**
(0.15)
0.55**
(0.04)
0.56**
(0.09)
1.32**
(0.08)
1.31**
(0.31)
1.37**
(0.20)
0.93*
(0.43)
ADF   test -2.23 -3.39 -2.80 -3.46 -3.24 -3.93 -1.73  -2.99 -2.03 -4.33 
2 WALD F  - 0.00**  - 0.00** - 0.00** -  0.00**  - 0.03* 
Notes: Part A: DF indicates a Dickey-Fuller test applies, while ** and * denote significance of a test (i.e. 
rejection of non-stationarity) at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.'is the first difference operator. Part 
B: (1) Coefficients’ standard errors are inside parentheses. 
2 WALD F    is a test of the null that all 
long-run coefficients are zero, with 
2() F  distribution. (2) ADL = autoregressive distributed lag. Critical 
values, at the 1% and 5% levels, for the ADF test applied to the residuals of the cointegrating relations are 
from MacKinnon (1991). The corresponding critical values are -4.27 and -3.53, and -5.28 and -4.48 for 
the EG and ADL regressions, respectively. A significant test means rejection of the hypothesis of non-
stationarity, i.e. a cointegrating relationship exists between the variables under analysis. (3) ** and * 
denote a coefficient/test is significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. LHS and RHS stand for left 
and right-hand side, respectively.  17
Table 2.  Bohn’s Government Surplus Reaction Functions, 1971-2000 
RHS/ Test  Peru  The  
Philippines
South
Africa
Thailand Venezuela 
The Dependent Variable is  Y
S
Constant 0.03 
(3.04)
0.03
(3.20)
0.02
(0.99)
0.07
(4.22)
0.11
(4.56)
 
1  t Y
D -0.06
(-2.99)
-0.02
(-1.66)
-0.08
(-1.11)
-0.22
(-2.69)
-0.12
(-2.64)
GVARt -0.36 
(-2.76)
-0.28
(-2.30)
-1.48
(-2.10)
-0.99
(-1.58)
-0.00001
(-0.06)
YVARt -0.54 
(-1.65)
-0.26
(-0.61)
-1.64
(-1.59)
-0.93
(-0.78)
-0.006
(-0.98)
R
2 0.40  0.24  0.16  0.42  0.31 
V 0.019 0.014  0.027 0.02  0.042 
Notes: heteroscedasticty and autocorrelation consistent (HACSE) standard errors are used in calculating 
the reported t-ratios. GVAR and YVAR are constructed following Barro (1986). 
2 R and V are the coef-
ficient of multiple correlation squared and the equation’s standard error, respectively. RHS stands for the 
variables in the right-hand side of the equations. 18
Table 3.  Unit Root Tests of the Debt-GDP Ratios, and Bohn’s Debt Reaction  
Functions
Test/RHS Peru  The   
Philippines
South
Africa
Thailand Venezuela 
Part A 
Unit root tests of  Y
D , 1972-2000 
ADF test statistic  -2.03  -1.82  -1.68  -2.97*  -1.46 
Part B
OLS estimations of Bohn’s Debt Reaction Functions, 1971-2000 
The Dependent Variable is    Y
D '
Constant 0.28 
(2.69)
0.15
(1.85)
0.09
(1.71)
0.28
(0.97)
0.29
(1.48)
 
1  t Y
D -0.42
(-2.72)
-0.21
(-1.63)
-0.23
(-1.61)
-1.31
(-1.10)
-0.53
(-1.50)
GVARt -1.73 
(-1.11)
1.64
(1.55)
0.88
(0.41)
4.56
(0.66)
-0.0005
(-0.84)
YVARt -0.38 
(-0.06)
4.34
(1.46)
3.85
(1.89)
38
(1.95)
-0.03
(-1.17)
R
2 0.11  0.16  0.10  0.28  0.15 
V 0.26 0.12  0.07 0.28  0.27 
Notes Part A: * denotes rejection of a unit root at the 5% level. Part B: heteroscedasticty and autocorrela-
tion consistent (HACSE) standard errors are used in calculating the reported t-ratios. GVAR and YVAR 
are constructed following Barro (1986). 
2 R and V are the coefficient of multiple correlation squared and 
the equation’s standard errors, respectively. ' is the first difference operator. RHS stands for the vari-
ables in the right-hand side of the equations. 19
Table A1.  Data Sources and Definitions: Peru, the Philippines, South Africa,     
Thailand, and Venezuela 
Current revenue, 
excluding grants
GB.RVC.TOTL.CN. Current LCU. 
External debt, total  DT.DOD.DECT.CD. Current US$.  South Africa’s and Thai-
land’s series comprise total domestic and external debt, and the 
source is the IMF’s IFS CD-ROM. The corresponding series co-
des are 19988Z..ZF and 57888Z..ZF, respectively. 
Current expenditure  GB.XPC.TOTL.CN. Current LCU. 
NY.GDP.MKTP.CD. Current US$. 
NY.GDP.MKTP.CN. Current LCU.  GDP For South Africa and Thailand nominal GDP is taken from the 
IMF’s CD-ROM. The series codes are 19999B.CZF and 
57899B..ZF for South Africa and Thailand, respectively. 
Population SP.POP.TOTL. Total. 
Consumer price 
index
FP.CPI.TOTL, 1995 = 100. 
Notes: World Bank Development Indicators CD-ROM (2002), and International Monetary Fund CD-
ROM 1.1.54. LCU = local currency units. Figure 1.  Recursive 1 E  t-ratios from Bohn’s Government Surplus Reaction Functions 
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